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Abstract
A quantum key distribution protocol based on entanglement swapping is proposed.
Through choosing particles by twos from the sequence and performing Bell mea-
surements, two communicators can detect eavesdropping and obtain the secure key.
Because the two particles measured together are selected out randomly, we need
neither alternative measurements nor rotations of the Bell states to obtain security.
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1 Introduction
As a kind of important resource, entanglement [1] is widely used in the re-
search of quantum information, including quantum communication, quantum
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cryptography and quantum computation. Entanglement swapping [2], abbre-
viated by ES, is a nice property of entanglement. That is, by appropriate
Bell measurements, entanglement can be swapped between different particles.
For example, consider two pairs of particles in the state of |Φ+〉, equivalently,
|Φ+〉12 = |Φ+〉34 = 1/
√
2(|00〉 + |11〉), where the subscripts denote different
particles. If we make a Bell measurement on 1 and 3, they will be entan-
gled to one of the Bell states. Simultaneously, 2 and 4 will be also projected
onto a corresponding Bell state. We can find the possible results through the
following process:
|Φ+〉12 ⊗ |Φ+〉34= 1
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)12 ⊗ (|00〉+ |11〉)34
=
1
2
(|0000〉+ |0101〉+ |1010〉+ |1111〉)1324
=
1
2
(|Φ+Φ+〉+ |Φ−Φ−〉+ |Ψ+Ψ+〉+ |Ψ−Ψ−〉)1324 (1)
It can be seen that there are four possible results: |Φ+〉13|Φ+〉24, |Φ−〉13|Φ−〉24,
|Ψ+〉13|Ψ+〉24 and |Ψ−〉13|Ψ−〉24. Furthermore, these results appear with equal
probability, that is, 1/4. For further discussion about ES, please see Refs.[3,4,5,6].
Quantum cryptography is the combination of quantum mechanics and cryp-
tography. It employs fundamental theories in quantum mechanics to obtain
unconditional security. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an important re-
search direction in quantum cryptography. Bennett and Brassard came up
with the first QKD protocol (BB84 protocol) in 1984 [7]. Afterwards, many
protocols were presented [8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22]. Recently,
several QKD schemes based on ES were proposed [23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30]. In
Refs.[23,24,25] the author introduced a protocol without alternative measure-
ments. It was simplified [26] and generalized [27] before long, and its security
was proved in Ref.[28]. Besides, by ES, doubly entangled photon pairs [29] and
previously shared Bell states [30] can be used to distribute secure key.
In this Letter we propose a QKD protocol based on ES, which needs nei-
ther alternative measurements [29] nor rotations of the Bell states [25,26,27].
The security against the attack discussed in Ref.[24] is assured by a special
technique, that is, random grouping (RG). See Sec.2 for the details of this
protocol. The security against general individual attack is analyzed in Sec.3
and a conclusion is given in Sec.4.
2 The QKD protocol
The particular process of this scheme is as follows:
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1. Prepare the particles. Alice generates a sequence of EPR pairs in the state
|Φ+〉AB = 1/
√
2(|00〉+ |11〉). For each pair, Alice stores one particle and sends
the other to Bob.
2. Detect eavesdropping.
(1) Having received all the particles from Alice, Bob randomly selects a set of
particles out and makes Bell measurements on them by twos.
(2) Bob tells Alice the sequence numbers and measurement results of the pairs
he measured.
(3) According to the sequence numbers, Alice performs Bell measurements on
the corresponding pairs, and compares her results with Bob’s. For example,
consider one of the pairs Bob measured, in which the sequence numbers of the
two particles are m and n, respectively. Then Alice measures her m-th and
n-th particles in Bell basis, and compares the two outcomes. As discussed in
Sec.1, if these particles were not eavesdropped, Alice and Bob should obtain
the same results. With this knowledge, Alice can determine, through the error
rate, whether there is any eavesdropping. If there are no eavesdroppers in the
channel, Alice and Bob proceed with the next step.
3. Obtain the key. Bob makes Bell measurements on his left particles by twos.
It should be emphasized that each pair he measures is selected out randomly.
Bob records the sequence numbers of all these pairs and sends the record to
Alice. Alice then measures her corresponding particles in Bell basis. As dis-
cussed in the above paragraphs, their measurement results would be identical.
Subsequently, Alice and Bob can obtain the raw key from these results. For
example, |Φ+〉, |Φ−〉, |Ψ+〉 and |Ψ−〉 are encoded into 00, 01, 10 and 11, re-
spectively. After error correction and privacy amplification [32], the raw key
will be processed into ideal secret key.
Thus the whole QKD protocol is finished. By this process, Alice and Bob
can obtain secure key. In this scheme, we use |Φ+〉 as the initial state. In
practice, any other Bell state is competent and the communicators can even
utilize various states for different pairs. It should be emphasized that, however,
the various initial states cannot improve the efficiency of QKD (the alleged
“high efficiency” in Ref.[30] is a mistake [31]). In fact, our protocol works in a
deterministic manner and then has full efficiency in the sense that one qubit-
transmission brings one key bit. That is, except for the detection particles,
the users can obtain 1 bit (raw) key per qubit-transmission in our protocol,
which is higher than the BB84 protocol (0.5 bit).
To compare the efficiency of our protocol with that of others deeply, we can
employ Cabello’s definition of QKD efficiency [19]. Let us give a simple exam-
ple to implement the above protocol and then calculate its efficiency. Suppose
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Alice and Bob deal with four EPR pairs (denoted as pairs 1,2,3,4, respectively)
in one step. More specifically, Alice sends four particles (each from one of the
four EPR pairs) to Bob and announces a classical (random) bit (0 or 1) after
Bob received this group of particles. If the classical bit is 0, they perform ES
on the pairs 1,3 and 2,4 to obtain the key. Otherwise they perform ES on the
pairs 1,4 and 2,3. In this example, Alice and Bob get four key bits by trans-
mitting four qubit and one cbit (classical bit). Obviously, the efficiency equals
to 0.8, which is relatively higher (For instance, the efficiency of the famous
protocols in Ref.[9], [7], [11], [8], [13], [23] is < 0.25, 0.25, ≤ 0.33, 0.5, 0.5,
0.67, respectively. See Table I in Ref.[19] for details).
3 Security
The above scheme can be regarded as secure because the key distributed
can not be eavesdropped imperceptively. There are two general eavesdropping
strategies for Eve. One is called “intercept and resend”, that is, Eve intercepts
the legal particles and replaces them by her counterfeit ones. For example,
Eve generates the same EPR pairs and sends one particle from each pair to
Bob, thus she can judge Bob’s measurement results as Alice does in step 3.
But in this case there are no correlations between Alice’s particles and the
counterfeit ones. Alice and Bob will get random measurement results when
they detect eavesdropping in step 2. Suppose both Alice and Bob use s pairs
to detect eavesdropping, the probability with which they obtain the same re-
sults is only (1/4)s . That is, Eve will be detected with high probability when
s is big enough. The second strategy for Eve is to entangle an ancilla with
the two-particle state that Alice and Bob are using. At some later time she
can measure the ancilla to gain information about the measurement results of
Bob. This kind of attack seems to be stronger than the first strategy. However,
it is invalid to our protocol as we prove below.
Because each particle transmitted in the channel is in a maximally mixed
state, there are no differences among all these particles for Eve. Furthermore,
Eve does not know which two particles Bob will put together to make a Bell
measurement. As a result, what she can do is to make the same operation on
each particle. Let |ϕ〉ABE denote the state of the composite system including
one certain EPR pair and the corresponding ancilla, where the subscripts A,
B and E express the particles belonging to Alice, Bob and Eve, respectively.
Note that each ancilla’s dimension is not limited here, and Eve is permitted
to build all devices allowed by the laws of quantum mechanics. What we
want to show is that |ϕ〉ABE must be a product of a two-particle state and
the ancilla if the eavesdropping introduces no errors into the QKD procedure,
which implies that Eve will gain no information about the key by observing the
ancilla. Conversely, if gaining information about the key, Eve will invariably
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introduce errors.
Without loss of generality, suppose the Schmidt decomposition [33] of |ϕ〉ABE
is in the form
|ϕ〉ABE = a1|ψ1〉AB|φ1〉E + a2|ψ2〉AB|φ2〉E
+a3|ψ3〉AB|φ3〉E + a4|ψ4〉AB|φ4〉E (2)
where |ψi〉 and |φj〉 are two sets of orthonomal states, ak are non-negative real
numbers (i, j, k = 1, 2, 3, 4 ).
Because |ψi〉 are two-particle (four-dimensional) states, they can be written
as the linear combinations of |00〉, |01〉, |10〉 and |11〉. Let
|ψ1〉 = b11|00〉+ b12|01〉+ b13|10〉+ b14|11〉
|ψ2〉 = b21|00〉+ b22|01〉+ b23|10〉+ b24|11〉
|ψ3〉 = b31|00〉+ b32|01〉+ b33|10〉+ b34|11〉
|ψ4〉 = b41|00〉+ b42|01〉+ b43|10〉+ b44|11〉 (3)
where bpq (p, q = 1, 2, 3, 4) are complex numbers. Then |ϕ〉ABE can be written,
thanks to Eqs.(2) and (3), as
|ϕ〉ABE = |00〉AB ⊗ (a1b11|φ1〉+ a2b21|φ2〉+ a3b31|φ3〉+ a4b41|φ4〉)E
+|01〉AB ⊗ (a1b12|φ1〉+ a2b22|φ2〉+ a3b32|φ3〉+ a4b42|φ4〉)E
+|10〉AB ⊗ (a1b13|φ1〉+ a2b23|φ2〉+ a3b33|φ3〉+ a4b43|φ4〉)E
+|11〉AB ⊗ (a1b14|φ1〉+ a2b24|φ2〉+ a3b34|φ3〉+ a4b44|φ4〉)E (4)
For convenience, we define four vectors (not quantum states) as follows:
vl = (a1b1l, a2b2l, a3b3l, a4b4l) l = 1, 2, 3, 4 (5)
Consider any two sets of particles on which Alice and Bob will do ES, the
state of the system is |ϕ〉ABE ⊗ |ϕ〉ABE . According to the properties of ES, we
can calculate the probability with which each possible measurement-results-
pair is obtained after Alice and Bob measured their particles in Bell basis. For
example, observe the event that Alice gets |Φ+〉 and Bob gets |Ψ+〉 , which
corresponds to the following item in the expansion:
1
2
|Φ+〉A|Ψ+〉B ⊗


4∑
r,s=1
(arbr1asbs2 + arbr2asbs1 + arbr3asbs4 + arbr4asbs3)|φrφs〉E

 (6)
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Therefore, this event occurs with the probability
P (Φ+AΨ
+
B) =
1
4
4∑
r,s=1
|arbr1asbs2 + arbr2asbs1 + arbr3asbs4 + arbr4asbs3|2 (7)
However, this event should not occur. In fact, if Eve wants to escape from the
detection of Alice and Bob, any results-pair other than Φ+Φ+, Φ−Φ−, Ψ+Ψ+
and Ψ−Ψ− should not appear. Let P (Φ+AΨ
+
B) = 0, we then have, from Eqs.(7)
and (5),
vT1 v2 + v
T
2 v1 + v
T
3 v4 + v
T
4 v3 = 0 (8)
in which vTl is the transpose of vl.
Similarly, let the probabilities of Φ+AΨ
−
B, Φ
−
AΨ
+
B and Φ
−
AΨ
−
B equal to 0, we get
vT1 v2 − vT2 v1 + vT3 v4 − vT4 v3 = 0 (9)
vT1 v2 + v
T
2 v1 − vT3 v4 − vT4 v3 = 0 (10)
vT1 v2 − vT2 v1 − vT3 v4 + vT4 v3 = 0 (11)
From Eqs.(8)-(11), we can obtain
vT1 v2 = v
T
2 v1 = v
T
3 v4 = v
T
4 v3 = 0 (12)
That is,


v1 = 0 or v2 = 0
v3 = 0 or v4 = 0
(13)
For the same reason, we can obtain the following results:
(1) Let the probabilities of Ψ+AΦ
+
B, Ψ
+
AΦ
−
B, Ψ
−
AΦ
+
B and Ψ
−
AΦ
−
B equal to 0, we
can get


v1 = 0 or v3 = 0
v2 = 0 or v4 = 0
(14)
(2) Let the probabilities of Φ+AΦ
−
B and Φ
−
AΦ
+
B equal to 0, we then have
vT1 v1 − vT2 v2 + vT3 v3 − vT4 v4 = 0 (15)
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vT1 v1 + v
T
2 v2 − vT3 v3 − vT4 v4 = 0 (16)
And then


v1 = ±v4
v2 = ±v3
(17)
(3) Let the probabilities of Ψ+AΨ
−
B and Ψ
−
AΨ
+
B equal to 0, we can get the same
conclusion as Eq.(17).
Finally, we can obtain three results from Eqs.(13), (14) and (17):
1. v1 = v2 = v3 = v4 = 0 ;
2. v1 = v4 = 0 and v2 = ±v3;
3. v2 = v3 = 0 and v1 = ±v4
That is, each of these results makes Eve succeed in escaping from the detection
of Alice and Bob. Now we observe what the state |ϕ〉ABE is by putting these
results into Eq.(4). If the first result holds, we have |ϕ〉ABE = 0, which is
meaningless for our analysis. Consider the condition where the second result
holds, |ϕ〉ABE can be written as:
|ϕ〉ABE =(|01〉 ± |10〉)AB ⊗ (a1b12|φ1〉
+ a2b22|φ2〉+ a3b32|φ3〉+ a4b42|φ4〉)E (18)
It can be seen that |ϕ〉ABE is a product of a two-particle state and the ancilla.
That is, there is no entanglement between Eve’s ancilla and the legal particles,
and Eve can obtain no information about the key. Similarly, we can draw the
same conclusion when the third result holds.
From another point of view, we can derive an effective relation between the
errors introduced in the key and the information gained by Eve as in Ref.[34].
Consider any two EPR pairs on which Alice and Bob will perform ES, for
example, Φ+12 and Φ
+
34, where particles 1, 3 and 2, 4 belong to Alice and Bob
respectively. As we know, when Alice and Bob make Bell measurements on
these particles, the marginal statistics of the measurement results are indepen-
dent of the measurement order. Suppose Alice makes her measurement before
Bob, the state of 2, 4 will thus be projected onto one of the Bell states |ξ〉.
Because of Eve’s intervention, these two particles will be entangled into Eve’s
ancilla and it follows that the state |ξ〉 becomes a mixed state ρ. The informa-
tion Bob can gain from ρ is bounded by the Holevo quantity χ(ρ) [33]. Let IEve
denote the information Eve can obtain, then IEve ≤ χ(ρ). (Obviously, Eve can
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not gain more information about Bob’s measurement result than Bob.) From
χ(ρ) = S(ρ)−∑
i
piS(ρi) (19)
we know S(ρ) is the upper bound of χ(ρ). “High fidelity implies low entropy”
[34]. Suppose
F (|ξ〉, ρ)2 = 〈ξ|ρ|ξ〉 = 1− γ (20)
where F (|ξ〉, ρ) is the fidelity [35] of the states |ξ〉 and ρ, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Therefore,
the entropy of ρ is bounded above by the entropy of a diagonal density matrix
ρmax with diagonal entries 1− γ, γ/3, γ/3, γ/3. The entropy of ρmax is
S(ρmax) = −(1− γ) log2(1− γ)− γ log2
γ
3
(21)
Then we have
IEve ≤ −(1− γ) log2(1− γ)− γ log2
γ
3
(22)
Let us discuss the connection between the fidelity F (|ξ〉, ρ) and the detection
probability d. When Alice and Bob detect eavesdropping, only |ξ〉 is the cor-
rect result, whereas any other Bell state will be regarded as an error. Since
F (|ξ〉, ρ)2 = 1− γ, the detection probability d = γ. From Eq.(22), we get
IEve ≤ −(1− d) log2(1− d)− d log2
d
3
(23)
It can be seen from this relation that when d = 0, i.e., Eve introduces no
error to the key, she will obtain no information, which is in agreement with
the above result. When γ > 0, i.e., Eve can gain some of Bob’s information,
but she has to face a nonzero risk d = γ of being detected. When γ = 3/4,
we have S(ρmax) = 2, which implies that Eve has the chance to eavesdrop
on all of Bob’s information. In this case, however, the detection probability is
no less than 3/4 per ES for eavesdropping detection. For example, when Eve
intercepts all the particles and resends new particles from her own EPR pairs,
she will get all of the information about Bob’s key while introduce 3/4 error
rate per ES.
To sum up, our protocol can resist the eavesdropping with ancilla.
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4 Conclusion
We have presented a full-efficiency QKD protocol based on ES. The security
against the attack discussed in Ref.[24] is assured by the technique of RG in-
stead of requiring alternative measurements [29] or rotations of the Bell states
[25,26,27]. Furthermore, this technique brings us another advantage. That is,
it is unnecessary to randomize the initial Bell states as in Refs.[23,25], which
leads to less Bell measurements in our protocol. For instance, to distribute two
key bits, Alice and Bob make two Bell measurements in our protocol, while
in Refs.[23,25] they must make three.
On the other hand, we have to confess that our protocol has a disadvantage,
i.e., it uses a sequence of entangled states instead of a single quantum system
[25,26,27] to generate the key. Nevertheless, it is not a fatal problem. Many
QKD protocols work in this model, for example, the famous E91 protocol [8].
Furthermore, each pair of particles is still in one of the Bell states and can be
reused in other applications after QKD.
In practical implementations, our scheme needs complete Bell states analysis.
Though Bell measurement has not been generally accomplished [36], it was
experimentally realized based on some certain techniques [37,38,39]. Further-
more, the realizations of entanglement swapping has been proposed [6,40].
Therefore, our scheme is within the reach of current technology.
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